THE INDONESIAN NATIONAL ARMED FORCES (TNI) AND FALINTIL- FORÇAS DE DEFESA DE TIMOR LESTE (F-FDTL)’S DEFENSE DIPLOMACY: A WAY OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN TIMOR LESTE by Ambarsari, Khory Wandira & Risman, Helda
 Ambarsari and Risman/ Jurnal Pertahanan Vol. 5 No. 3 (2019) pp.115-125 
 
115 
 
Jurnal Pertahanan 
 
Media Informasi tentang Kajian dan Strategi Pertahanan 
yang Mengedepankan Identity, Nationalism dan Integrity 
e-ISSN: 2549-9459 
http://jurnal.idu.ac.id/index.php/DefenseJournal 
THE INDONESIAN NATIONAL ARMED FORCES (TNI) AND 
FALINTIL- FORÇAS DE DEFESA DE TIMOR LESTE (F-FDTL)’S 
DEFENSE DIPLOMACY: A WAY OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN 
TIMOR LESTE 
 
Khory Wandira Ambarsari 
Indonesia Defense University 
IPSC Area, Sentul, Sukahati, Citeureup, Bogor, West Java, Indonesia 16810 
khorywandira95@gmail.com 
 
Helda Risman 
Indonesia Defense University 
IPSC Area, Sentul, Sukahati, Citeureup, Bogor, West Java, Indonesia 16810 
rismancan@gmail.com 
 
 
 
Article Info 
 
Article history:  
Received 30 October 2019 
Revised 1 December 2019 
Accepted 2 December 2019 
 
 
Keywords: 
Defense Diplomacy, 
Conflict Resolution, 
Indonesia National Army (TNI) 
F-FDTL, 
Timor Leste 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DOI: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.33172/jp.v5i
3.617 
 
Abstract 
 
 
Indonesia and Timor Leste have had an irrelevant relationship 
related to the history of Seroja Operation on 7 December 1975 
when the TNI, formerly known as ABRI (Armed Forces of the 
Republic of Indonesia) carried out a total military operation in 
order to keep Timor Leste for not separate from Indonesia, while 
later it caused losses where many TNI and Falintil- Forças De 
Defesa De Timor Leste (F-FDTL)’s personnel were killed in the 
war. Time passed, now the relationship between both countries is 
getting better due to the efforts from the Indonesian and Timor 
Leste’s parties, especially the national armies, had been done. To 
solve the conflict between those countries, defense diplomacy is 
needed. In this article, the writers tend to describe how both armed 
forces conduct defense diplomacy so Indonesia and Timor Leste’s 
relationship is getting better, indeed now both countries have done 
some collaborations in some aspects in the economy and military. 
Later, the writers will analyze more to find out the best conflict 
resolution that had been done by both armed forces, and the 
existence of each State Leaders’ participation. It is clearly stated 
that by utilizing defense diplomacy through visiting state leaders, 
having an official meeting, holding military cooperation such as 
doing exchange troops are some best ways of conflict resolution 
that can be done by Indonesia and Timor Leste to create a better 
relationship.  
 
© 2019 Published by Indonesia Defense University   
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INTRODUCTION  
Timor Leste, formerly known as East 
Timor, is located less than 400 miles in the 
northwest of Australia's coast which has an 
area of 18,889 square kilometers with a 
population of 700,000 in 1975 (Horta, 
1998). On 17 July 1976, East Timor was 
designated by President Soeharto to be the 
27th province in the Republic of Indonesia, 
but then through a referendum on 30 August 
1999 the majority of East Timor’s 
population chose to be free. Finally, on 20 
May 2002, East Timor, which changed its 
name to Timor Leste, was officially 
recognized by the United Nations as an 
independent country (Pinto, 2014). 
FALINTIL, Forças Armadas da 
Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste 
(Timor-Leste National Liberation Army), 
or now named F-FDTL was founded by the 
FRETILIN party and was formed on 20 
August 1975 in response to political 
upheaval (Buletin La’o Hamutuk, 2005). F-
FDTL is an armed force in Timor Leste 
which was served as a defense unit to 
protect the territory of Timor Leste. Those 
two armed forces have an inaccurate 
relationship related to the history of Seroja 
Operation on 7 December 1975 in which the 
TNI, formerly known as ABRI (Armed 
Forces of the Republic of Indonesia) 
conducted a total military operation to 
control Dili and besiege Timor Leste from 
land, sea, and air. Baucau, Suai, Aileu, 
Ermera, and Lospalos cities were then 
successfully seized by ABRI with hard 
work. However, this Seroja Operation 
caused an extraordinary loss in which many 
ABRI and F-FDTL personnel were killed in 
the war. 
The problems, that arose when Timor 
Leste wanted to be free and separated from 
Indonesia, triggered both sides and caused 
many casualties indicates that there has not 
been good diplomacy between the two 
parties. The different backgrounds in the 
political aspect between both countries also 
affected the conflict. The former President 
of the Republic of Indonesia, Suharto, 
concern at the time was to prevent the 
formation of a left nationalist regime which 
was developed well in Timor Leste 
(Citkowski, 2019). 
This article will describe how both 
armed forces and the State Leaders conduct 
defense diplomacy by recognizing it, then 
the conflict resolution will be discovered 
therefore both countries have a better 
relationship and do some collaborations. By 
analyzing those aspects, it is important to 
know about the existence of each State 
Leaders's participation in managing defense 
diplomacy as a way of conflict resolution.  
 
RESEARCH METHODS  
This paper uses a qualitative method to 
analyze the case. It has a role to gain an in-
depth understanding of the use of defense 
diplomacy as a way of conflict resolution 
between TNI and F-FDTL. In this article, 
the writers use documentation method and 
by utilizing literature study (Cresswell, 
2010) to obtain weighted data and as written 
evidence from sources of books, 
newspapers, papers, websites, memos, 
research documents, announcements, 
magazines, instructions, statements, or 
personal documents like email or letters 
related to the topic. A literature study, 
moreover, is used by doing research on 
documents relating to the object of research 
and also combining information from 
secondary data to obtain information. The 
approach used in this paper is 
phenomenology by identifying the essence 
of human experiences about a phenomenon 
(in this case is about the defense diplomacy 
between TNI and F-FDTL as a way of 
conflict resolution) as described by 
participants (Sugiyono, 2018). 
In Timor Leste’s case, defense 
diplomacy is needed to get a resolution 
towards the conflict that has happened.   
Defense diplomacy is the peacetime use of 
armed forces and related infrastructure 
(primarily defense ministries) as a tool of 
foreign and security policy and more 
specifically the use of military cooperation 
and assistance (Cottey & Forster, 2004) 
Defense diplomacy occurs when 
agreement or understanding between 
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countries takes place intending to achieve 
peace. It is carried out to understand the 
world constellation in a diplomatic way 
using the perspective of national defense. In 
defense diplomacy’s application, there are 
two concepts inside: by using hard power or 
soft power. Hard power emphasizes the use 
of armed force and tends to be coercive. 
According to Joseph S. Nye (Nye, 2004), 
hard power can be applied by using 
solicitation, coercion, violence, and threats. 
It also can be done through various sources: 
power, payment, sanctions, and bribes. 
While soft power is an ability using a 
persuasive invitation or using the power of 
attraction to get the pretension (Nye, 2004).  
The defense diplomacy concept in this 
article will be used as a way to analyze the 
conflict resolution. Johan Galtung 
formulated the conflict in the form of a 
triangle called the conflict ABC triangle 
(1958, p. 105). There are sequences of 
conflicts that are spelled out in them. (A) or 
attitude includes assumptions, cognition, 
emotions in the form of prejudices, beliefs, 
perceptions, and feelings held by one party 
towards another party. Attitude is also 
aimed at the mental states of the actors 
(Johan, 1973). (B) or behavior is a form of 
mental, verbal expression, or physical 
expression in the form of statements, 
violations, insults, and attacks caused in 
conflict. These attitudes not only affect 
individual behavior, but also other 
behaviors. Behavior leads to new 
incompatibilities, a sequence of derived 
conflict that is generated by acts of physical 
and verbal violence. (C) or conflict is the 
contradiction in purpose between the parties 
leading to a conflict that causes acts of 
violence and behavior (Johan, 1973). 
Conflict resolution is an effort to resolve 
the conflict that is happened. Galtung 
defines conflict resolution, that is a process 
leading the action system to a state where 
the condition in the conflict happened is no 
longer present, also the system there must 
no longer have two or more incompatible 
goal-states (Johan, 1973). The settlement of 
the problem takes 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The Conflict ABC Triangle 
Source: Johan, 1973 
 
the form of an agreement made by the 
parties to the conflict with a democratic 
way, build and prioritize the benefits of both 
parties to achieve peace. In seeking conflict 
resolution, it can also involve a third party 
outside the conflict parties where the third 
party must be neutral, wise, fair, and have 
no interest in resolving the conflict (Johan, 
1973). Conflict resolution will encourage 
and strengthen national integration. This 
conflict resolution is an effective step to 
deal with conflict until the root of the 
problem. Conflict resolution must be done 
by considering the needs and fears of each 
conflicting party, to build mutual trust, 
providing opportunities for community 
support for an agreement, and seeing peace 
as an open process.  
Meanwhile, Galtung stated that to 
resolve a conflict, it means to decide 
whether who is the winner and who is the 
loser or also what the future distribution of 
value shall be. Besides, it also means to 
administer the distribution of value, and to 
define the conflict as terminated (Galtung, 
1965). Four conflict resolution strategies 
can be done, they are through negotiation, 
mediation, diplomacy, and creative 
peacebuilding. 
 
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION  
TNI and F-FDTL’s Defense Diplomacy: 
A Way Of Conflict Resolution In Timor 
Leste  
Indonesian National Army or commonly 
abbreviated to be TNI, based on the Law of 
(A) Attitude (B) Behavior 
(C) Conflict 
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the Republic of Indonesia Number 34 of 
2004 concerning the Indonesian National 
Army Article 7 Paragraph 2, is the main 
actor who has to guard the border region. 
The existence of the Border Security Task 
Force (Satgas Pamtas) has become a form 
of military campaign strategy to safeguard 
national sovereignty as well as being a 
deterrence to threats at the border (Gumilar, 
2017). In this case, the power of the TNI is 
mobilized by the government as the 
implementation of political decisions to 
maintain the people's security, territorial 
sovereignty, and the stability of the 
Indonesian state. 
Timor Leste is a country that currently 
shares a direct land border with Indonesia 
(Anggitta, 2014). The existence of a 
referendum which resulted in the 
independence of Timor Leste from 
Indonesia caused several conflicts since 
before the separation until it has become a 
sovereign country now. The conflict was 
not only based on the feud of the TNI and 
F-FDTL as the armed forces of each 
country but also resulted from several 
parties either from the government or civil 
society. The desire of some East Timorese 
to make Timor Leste a sovereign state and 
part of East Timorese who still want Timor 
Leste to be part of the provinces in 
Indonesia, causing conflicts which then 
spread to cause war outbreaks. 
The conflict between Indonesia and 
Timor Leste by involving the Indonesian 
National Armed Forces (TNI) and F-FDTL 
then caused relations between those 
countries became unfavorable since 1975, 
in which after the Seroja Operation killed 
many soldiers and civilians between the two 
parties. Timor Leste (East Timor at that 
time) felt that the integration process carried 
out by Indonesia with the support of 
western countries (the United States and 
Australia) was felt to be detrimental to 
Timor Leste because of the integration 
process was carried out by force and was 
coercive. The existence of support from the 
western countries was also motivated by the 
concern of the west if Timor Leste (East 
Timor) became the basis of communism 
with Fretilin as the main force which had 
Marxist-Communist orientation (Pinto, 
2014). Then there was a referendum on 30 
August 1999 in which East Timor voted for 
independence and was also motivated by 
the attitude of the United Nations which did 
not approve of Indonesia's integration into 
East Timor. On 20 May 2002, East Timor 
became an independent country and 
changed its name to Timor Leste. 
Taylor (Taylor, 1998), in his book, stated 
that the Seroja operation which had taken 
place, if closely watched, was a symbol of 
military annexation which was a strategy 
and a way to resolve the problem of 
Portuguese Timor in a fast way (Horta, 
1998). This operation becomes an example 
of the application of defense diplomacy 
carried out with the concept of hard power. 
The real proof is when the Indonesian 
Armed Forces (TNI) assumed absolute 
control in the political, social and economic 
fields when it occupied Timor Leste. 
However, it is not one hundred percent true 
that TNI used hard power in preserving 
Timor Leste, but they also did soft power to 
improve and develop the quality of human 
resources of Timor Leste people. TNI 
utilized school and church buildings there 
to educate East Timorese’s mental building 
and to teach science not only for the 
children but also for the people who wanted 
to learn. TNI has also done some 
development in Timor Leste. They built 
Puskesmas (Centers of Public Health to 
improve the East Timoese’s health, because 
Timor Leste lacked Health Center and also 
doctor, and it was a struggle for them to 
seek medicine there. TNI also repaired 
some infrastructures to increased the living 
standard in economical aspect in Timor 
Leste, like building the road to connect the 
isolated area and to facilitate transportation 
and communication. In the other side, the 
Indonesia government through TNI held 
state defense training to increase people's 
awareness of their responsibility as a citizen 
(Pusat Sejarah TNI, 2016). 
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In the case of Timor Leste and Indonesia, 
the conflict that occurred was a vertical 
conflict between the center versus the area 
where Timor Leste (East Timor) which 
belong a territory to Indonesia was trying to 
hold a referendum to be independent and 
free from Indonesia. Therefore, diplomacy 
is required to handle conflict as a resolution. 
Resolution is a decision or unanimity of 
opinion in the form of a request or demand 
determined by deliberation. 
Based on Galtung’s Conflict ABC 
Triangle, we can see that the conflict 
appeared when some of the East Timorese 
believed Timor Leste should separate from 
Indonesia and became an independent 
country due to the difference principle 
concerning the political aspect. It referred to 
the attitude (A) or assumption from one side 
since Indonesia thought that Timor Leste 
better became Indonesia's province 
considered from the economic situation. 
The resistance from F-FDTL towards TNI 
indicates the behavior (B) of East Timorese 
that caused a great conflict (C) even 
violence between them. 
As an effort to resolve the conflict 
between the two armed forces, Indonesia 
and Timor Leste tried to conduct diplomacy 
in the form of meetings and negotiations. 
This diplomacy firstly conducted by 
Danrem Purwanto and guerrilla commander 
Kay Rala Xanana Gusmao (East Timor’s 
leader) in Lariguto in 1983. After their 
meeting, then Xanana Gusmao with Major 
Gatot and Major Wiliam da Costa and 
TNI’s captain in Buburake, Viqueque, met 
on 20 March 1983 discussing peace so that 
the conflict in Timor Leste could end soon 
(Pinto, 2014). After the first meeting took 
place, the two parties held a second and 
third meeting subsequently provided there 
were representatives from the United 
Nations and international observers in 
accompanying the negotiation process and 
the implementation of the peace agreement.  
Since July 1983, the diplomatic way to 
the East Timor issue has focused on the UN-
sponsored tripartite dialogue between 
Portugal and Indonesia (Lloyd, 2003). This 
is the main method, also the principle 
construct that led to the current diplomatic 
resolution. The pressure from international 
and organizational in all sorts of kinds 
across the economic, political, and cultural 
realms contributed, as did various acts of 
challenge initiated by the State Leader or 
politician figures such as Bishop Carlos 
Belo, Xanana Gusmao, and Jose Ramos 
Horta. With the downfall of the New Order 
regime from Soeharto-led in Indonesia, the 
East Timorese people, aided by 
international and United Nations diplomatic 
and economic pressure, were presented, on 
30 August 1999, with the first opportunity 
to determine its future since the vote for 
integration in 1976. 
According to Tur Matan Ruak, a military 
figure and politician who now is the Prime 
Minister of Timor Leste, the peace contact 
carried out in 1983 was a way of resolution 
and initiation from Indonesia (Pinto, 2014). 
He considered the Indonesian side to adopt 
a form of diplomacy using military force 
that also used soft power by 'seducing' and 
offering what Timor Leste wanted and then 
could make Timor Leste follow Indonesia's 
will. Then between the year 1992 until 
1995, Indonesian and Portuguese Ministers 
of Foreign Affair held meetings persistently 
seven times to discuss the resolution in 
Timor Leste. Ali Alatas, the Indonesian 
Ministers of Foreign Affair in that time 
together with Joao Deus Pinheiro (the 
Portuguese Ministers of Foreign Affair) and 
Kofie Annan (the United Nations Secretary-
General) had a deal for having a fair and 
comprehensive settlement in Timor Leste 
under the supervision from the United 
Nation (Pusat Sejarah TNI, 2016). This 
kind of diplomacy demonstrated that 
Indonesia utilized defense diplomacy as a 
way of conflict resolution which was 
happened in Timor Leste.  
 After those lengthy negotiations, a 
ceasefire was finally agreed upon in which 
Timor Leste requested several conditions to 
the Indonesian party: 1) to withdraw 
Indonesian troops from Timor Leste 
without any conditions, 2) to open up 
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opportunities for UN peacekeeping troops, 
3) for free consultation with the Timor 
Leste’s people, and 4) F-FDTL troops are 
maintained to protect people's freedom and 
to avoid intimidation. By analyzing the 
decision from the Timor Leste’s side, it is 
clearly stated that Timor Leste also used 
defense diplomacy in proposing the 
requirements, especially on the fourth point 
where Timor Leste still used their military 
as a means of national defense in 
maintaining the sovereignty of Timor 
Leste’s territory. 
Furthermore, when the Suharto era was 
replaced by B.J. Habibie, he declared that 
he was considering to offer special status 
and also wide-ranging autonomy towards 
Timor Leste on 9 June 1998 (Lloyd, 2003). 
Then on 18 June 1998, Ali Alatas, the 
Foreign Affairs Minister in Soeharto and 
Habibie's era, formally confirmed the offer 
to the Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary-
General at that time, and also to Portugal 
(Lloyd, 2003). However, Portugal refused 
this offer. As a good intention, Habibie later 
announced a program of troop withdrawals 
from Timor Leste. Indonesian government 
thought it would satisfy East Timorese 
people so they could keep Timor Leste 
remaining a part of Indonesia. It is indicated 
that Indonesia through the state leader was 
struggling to do defense diplomacy towards 
Timor Leste without doing any harm acts 
but prefer using its soft power. This 
diplomatic way was done to get the conflict 
resolution of this conflict. 
Then on 31 October 1998, the fourth All-
inclusive Intra-East Timorese Dialogue 
(AIETD) opened in Krumbach, Austria 
which was initiated in June 1995 in Burg 
Schlaining to give the autonomy proposal 
that was offered by the Indonesian 
Government and the pivotal stage of United 
Nations-sponsored negotiations (Lloyd, 
2003). However, those ways failed and 
Timor Leste had its referendum and 
separated from Indonesia. The referendum 
of Timor Leste happened on 30 August 
1999 when B.J. Habibie was influenced by 
a letter from Australian Prime Minister 
John Howard that caused Timor Leste to 
break away from Indonesia authority and 
formally recognized its independence on 20 
May 2002 (Pinto, 2014). 
After the referendum on Timor Leste's 
independence, the relation between 
Indonesia and Timor Leste deteriorated. 
However, Timor Leste then reopens 
cooperation relations with Indonesia after 
its independence, and this has become one 
of Timor Leste's foreign policies like a 
sovereign state (Riski, 2011). Timor Leste 
began to take part in maintaining the 
continuity of international politics, 
especially in a safe and cooperative regional 
region through a good relationship with 
Indonesia, and this was welcomed by 
Indonesia.  
 The Indonesian government focuses its 
operation on the maintenance of national 
unity and on its leadership capacity for 
dealing with the conflicts towards Timor 
Leste. It must attempt to adjust the 
requirement for interior help with the 
requirement for global help. In the political 
and diplomatic context, relations with 
Indonesia keep on being an essential 
component that will affect the security of 
Timor-Leste. Knowing this, the political 
leaders of Timor-Leste have been very 
cautious in adopting a disposition of 
cooperation with its all the more powerful 
neighbor. The two countries have gained 
progress in setting up the diplomatic 
representation crucial to maintain normal 
relations and increase cooperation between 
them. This incorporates the exceptionally 
successful visit of Prime Minister Mari 
Alkatiri to Jakarta in June 2003, and the 
implementation of a Joint Ministerial 
Commission, the consenting to of a 
cooperation agreement between both 
countries and the regular official visits that 
the President of Timor Leste Xanana 
Gusmão has made to Indonesia to fortify the 
bilateral relationship (Timor Leste’s 
Government, 2007).  
The Timor Leste-Indonesia Joint 
Ministerial Commission was a follow-up to 
the memorandum of understanding on 
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bilateral cooperation that was signed 
between the Government of Republic of 
Indonesia and the Government of Timor 
Leste during President Xanana Gusmao's 
visit to Jakarta in July 2002 (Anggitta, 
2014), which was held on 7-8 October 
2002. The Indonesian delegation was led by 
the then Foreign Minister, Hassan 
Wirayuda, and the East Timorese 
delegation was led by Timor Leste's foreign 
minister Jose Ramos Horta. The Joint 
Ministerial Commission aims to discuss 
various efforts on improving bilateral 
relations, including unresolved residual 
issues as a consequence of the 
establishment of Timor Leste as a sovereign 
state (Saldanha, 2018). 
Agreement Between The Government 
Of The Republic Of Indonesia And The 
Government Of The Democratic Republic 
Of Timor Leste Concerning Cooperative 
Activities In The Field Of Defense, as the 
enclosure of Law Number 4 Year 2015 
(Ministry of Defense, 2015) which was 
signed by the Minister of Defense of the 
Republic of Indonesia Purnomo 
Yusgiantoro and the Minister of Defense 
and Security of Timor Leste Kay Rala 
Xanana Gusmao on 19 August 2011, 
becomes the best diplomatic way in both 
side as a conflict resolution. By this 
agreement, Indonesia and Timor Leste aim 
to increase and broaden the bilateral 
relationship through defense relationship 
based on the principle of equality, mutual 
benefit and full respect towards sovereignty 
and territorial integrity. In article two 
describes the forms of cooperation in the 
defense sector, they are: 1) dialogue and 
bilateral consultations on defense and 
military-strategic issues which are the 
mutual interests of the two countries, 2) 
exchange of information in the field of 
defense and other matters, 3) increasing the 
work cooperation with the armed forces, 4) 
cooperation in logistical support and 5) 
cooperation in other fields mutually agreed 
by the two countries. 
In this agreement, the government of 
Indonesia and East Timor agreed to form a 
"joint committee" in the defense field. The 
Joint Committee has the aim to start, 
coordinate, and monitor all types of 
activities carried out on various cooperation 
issues that previously have been explained. 
In the implementation, the Joint Committee 
holds a meeting once every two years, and 
the meeting place will take place both in 
Indonesia and in Timor Leste based on 
mutual agreement. With this, the diplomacy 
process between the two countries has 
become easier because in the process 
defense officials representing the Joint 
Committee; both the Minister of Defense 
and military forces; make an official visit 
where this becomes a concrete step in 
formulating conflict resolution. 
During the era of Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono's leadership, defense 
diplomacy began to emerge against Timor 
Leste as a form of bilateral cooperation to 
improve relations between the two 
countries. The form of defense diplomacy 
undertaken is by the existence of military 
training as an effort to improve the military 
sector. This method was considered by 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono as an effort to 
resolve the conflict between the two 
countries where they need each other in 
defense matters by sending military 
representatives, and each country studied 
the defense systems, also as a result of their 
geographical position as a neighboring 
country. 
The other prove of the diplomatic way is 
by the two-day state visit of President 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in Timor 
Leste which had the aim of honoring the 
independence of Timor Leste. Besides, this 
state visit also showed the friendly attitude 
of Indonesia towards Timor Leste to build 
cooperation. The desire of President Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono to open a land route 
between Indonesia and Timor Leste is 
aimed to enhance cooperation in the 
economic field and also to strengthen 
cultural ties. During the meeting with Prime 
Minister Xanana Gusmao, cooperation was 
signed to resolve the borderlines of the two 
neighboring countries and several other 
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issues. As we know that Timor Leste did 
experience various kinds of difficulties, 
especially in the economic field. The 
operational costs of the government 
bureaucracy of Timor Leste still depend on 
foreign aid. With the problems experienced 
by Timor Leste, it makes an opportunity for 
Indonesia to help Timor Leste as a way of 
diplomacy to improve relations between the 
two countries as well as a way of conflict 
resolution (Inayati, 2005). 
Regardless of the state matters, the close 
relationship between President Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono and Timor Leste’s 
Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao is an 
interesting thing to consider in achieving 
conflict resolution between Indonesia and 
Timor Leste. It should be known that both 
State Leaders have a good friendship for a 
long time ago. Both of their actions in 
politic are also quite successful. in 2014 
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono 
once invited East Timor Prime Minister 
Xanana Gusmao to visit his private home in 
Puri Indah Cikeas in the context of an 
invitation to a state dinner (Lumanauw, 
2014).  
In that event, President Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono used soft power as a diplomatic 
method by approaching the Prime Minister 
of Timor Leste more personally. It can be 
an evidence that can be shown to the people 
of Indonesia and Timor Leste if the 
relationship between both countries is going 
well regardless of the bad history behind the 
political relationship between them 
previously related to the use of the armed 
forces. It is necessary to remember that both 
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and 
Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao have a 
military background. 
Other than that, the Adipurna awarding 
from President Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono to Prime Minister Xanana 
Gusmao that was given on 10 October 2014 
at the Bali Democracy Forum in Nusa Dua, 
Bali (Maulana, 2014) is the highest award 
given by the Indonesian government to 
foreign citizens who are considered to be 
instrumental in maintaining and 
strengthening Indonesia's bilateral relations 
with the country.  
 Timor Leste through the National Defence 
Strategy has planned the development of 
potential aspects, diplomatic, political, 
economic, military, and psychological, to 
guarantee the achievement of national 
objectives. It can be done not only in a 
peacetime but also a war and have to cover: 
1) develop proactive diplomacy guided  by 
the upper interests of Timor Leste, 2) adopt 
a military strategy embodying a defensive 
and discouraging (proactive) stance, with 
the longer-term views of developing 
offensive and discouraging capability 
within the future, 3) outline the operational 
scope of the armed forces in step with the 
strategic environment, 4) construct and 
acquire reciprocal discouraging power 
components, 5) establish the utilization of 
resources and integrated means (Timor 
Leste’s Government, 2007). Based on those 
statements, the government of Timor Leste 
seriously arrange its national defense 
strategy particularly in creating a good 
diplomatic way to other countries, also 
towards Indonesia. the utilizing of armed 
forces by Timor Leste indicates that defense 
diplomacy is considered to be truly 
important in establishing diplomatic 
relations.  
 Meanwhile, Indonesia through TNI does 
diplomatic relations by utilizing 'soft 
power'. It can be proven when TNI's 
commander, TNI Marshal, Hadi Tjahjanto 
did afternoon tea with F-FDTL’s 
commander, Major General Tito Da Costa 
Critovao in Belu Regency, NTT Indonesia 
lately on Thursday, 28 August 2019 
(Puspen TNI, 2019). This afternoon party 
indicates that between Indonesia and Timor 
Leste armed forces are having a better 
relationship. Besides, the main cause of this 
meeting was to increase military 
cooperation in the education sector by 
doing troops exchange between Indonesia 
and Timor Leste.  
 Borderlands become the other important 
problem between Indonesia and Timor 
Leste since Timor Leste chose to secede 
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from the territory of Indonesia. This 
problem, in advance, became the 
complicated case that made the relationship 
between both countries was getting worse. 
However now, this problem can be solved 
surely by doing negotiations on the 
delimitation of the maritime boundaries 
after settling the borderland borders. It can 
be seen when the Coordinating Political, 
Security, and Legal Affairs Minister of 
Indonesia, Wiranto, met Timor Leste’s 
chief border negotiator, Xanana Gusmao, in 
Jakarta on 23 July 2019. They exchanged 
memoranda of agreement on land borders 
and they have agreed on the settlement of 
the unresolved borders; they are Noel Besi-
Citrana and Bidjael Sunan-Oben (The 
Jakarta Post, 2019).  
 The relationship between Indonesia and 
Timor Leste is getting better nowadays that 
can be proven by the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, Retno 
L. P. Marsudi, on May 17, 2019 held a 
bilateral meeting with the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of the 
Democratic Republic of East Timor, 
Dionisio Da Costa Babo Soares at the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic 
of Indonesia Jakarta. In this meeting, the 
two sides discussed various issues related to 
cooperation in the Pacific region, border 
negotiations between Indonesia and Timor 
Leste, bilateral cooperation in trade and 
investment and capacity building support. 
besides, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and 
Cooperation of the Democratic Republic of 
East Timor also aims to follow up on his 
application as a member of ASEAN 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of 
Indonesia, 2019). 
 In that meeting, the border issue was 
discussed by the two ministers where they 
considered negotiations on land boundaries 
between the two countries to be the top 
priority. They also hope that this long-
running negotiation can be completed as 
soon as possible. The official visit of the 
two countries certainly includes the defense 
attache of each country which they are a 
'diplomatic' tool in the field of defense. 
Defense attache is an important part of 
diplomacy activities that occur between 
both countries since they are representative 
of each country and they understand very 
well about the problems and fundamental 
conflicts that occur so that the presence of 
the meeting becomes a piece of concrete 
evidence as a way of conflict resolution 
between Indonesia and Timor Leste. 
 By looking at some evidence above, it can 
be seen that the understanding and 
trustworthiness formed between Indonesia 
and Timor Leste along with the time, and it 
gives priority in using defense diplomacy in 
doing diplomatic relations, which is a way 
of conflict resolution. Now, both countries 
still doing diplomatic relations in a good 
way especially by the State Leaders and 
also the military parties. 
  
CONCLUSIONS 
This article uses a qualitative method and 
phenomenological approached to analyze 
and describe the defense diplomacy done by 
TNI and F-FDTL as a way of conflict 
resolution in Timor Leste. Defense 
diplomacy and conflict resolution concept 
are also used by the writers in this article to 
make a better explanation in analyzing the 
case. As we know that Indonesia and Timor 
Leste have a bad history about the territory 
problem, so in this article, the writers tend 
to give some evidence that the diplomatic 
relation between both countries is getting 
better.  
Defense diplomacy between the 
Indonesian National Army (TNI) and F-
FDTL has been seen since the two countries 
experienced conflicts before Timor Leste 
held a referendum and became an 
independent state. Defense diplomacy was 
carried out by holding a meeting between 
the leaders of the state and the military 
between the two parties in determining the 
peace agreement as one way of conflict 
resolution.  
Now, the development of diplomacy 
between the two countries is getting better. 
Thus it is clear that there was a change in 
the defense diplomacy way carried out 
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which is first done by hard power, then 
turned into soft power by prioritizing the 
establishment of peace. It could be marked 
by the visiting state leaders between both 
countries discussing the diplomatic relation 
in some aspects like military and economic, 
having an official meeting, and holding 
military cooperation such as doing 
exchange troops. The existence of the 
understanding and trustworthiness along 
with them also affects their relationship. 
Those are some best ways of conflict 
resolution that can be done by Indonesia 
and Timor Leste to create a better 
relationship.  
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